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LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN, PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND SAFETY, AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
VICKIE J. WILLIAMS* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Legitimate scientific research, if misused or misapplied, can pose a 
possible or real threat to public health, our conceptions of morality, or even 
life as we know it. The existence of such “dual use research of concern” 
(DURC)1 poses difficult legal questions regarding the appropriate balance 
between competing interests in public safety and freedom of expression, 
including questions about the advisability of using the law as the tool to 
balance these interests. 
Recently, such difficult questions were presented by life sciences DURC 
when two teams of government-funded researchers succeeded in 
transforming the usually difficult-to-transmit avian influenza virus into an 
airborne virus easily transmissible between mammals.2 The scientists 
reported the results of their experiments to the National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the public agency that funded the 
experiments, and also sought to publish the results in mainstream, well-
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 1. Dual Use Research of Concern in the context of the life sciences is defined as 
“research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide 
knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a 
significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural 
crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security.” See OFF. 
SCI. & TECH. POLICY, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE 
SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 2 (2013) available at http://www.phe.gov/s3/dual 
use/Documents/oversight-durc.pdf. 
 2. Martin Enserink, Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings, 334 SCIENCE 
1192, 1192 (2011). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
82 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:81 
respected scientific journals.3 NIAID requested that the National Science 
Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) review the manuscripts to determine 
whether publication might trigger national security concerns.4 Initially, after 
reviewing the manuscripts, the NSABB recommended redacting them to 
remove the methodology and details that could enable replication of the 
experiments.5 Much of the scientific community argued that compliance with 
this request would eviscerate the nature of scientific experimentation, which 
requires that results of experiments be replicable by others in order to allow 
the continued growth of scientific knowledge.6 Therefore, the NSABB’s 
request generated a major controversy within the scientific and legal 
communities. This request illustrated the difficulty of reconciling the needs 
and culture of the scientific community for openness and collaboration to 
advance science, with the needs and culture of the government for secrecy 
to ensure national security when DURC is produced. 
Ultimately, the NSABB reversed its position, and the two papers were 
published without incident (to date).7 Nevertheless, the difficulty of balancing 
the government’s power to control and direct the course of scientific 
research to protect the public from harm, with the needs of scientists for 
freedom to experiment and communicate their results in the name of 
science, remains unresolved. The federal government funds a large portion 
of the scientific and life sciences research done in the U.S.8 The tool it 
traditionally uses for controlling scientific research is to place contractual 
limitations on how such research is conducted, and/or how and to whom it 
is communicated.9 However, such government-imposed limitations on 
conducting scientific research, or publishing the results of the research, may 
impinge on the scientists’ First Amendment rights of free expression, thus 
triggering legal review under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Oversight Hearing on Biological Security: The Risk of Dual-Use Research: Hearing 
Before the U.S. S. Comm’n on Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 112th Cong. 8 (2012) 
[hereinafter The Risk of Dual-Use Research] (Testimony of Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director, 
Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases). 
 6. See Enserink, supra note 2, at 1193. See, e.g., Victoria Stodden, The Scientific 
Method in Practice: Reproducibility in the Computational Sciences 3 (MIT Sloan School 
Working Paper No. 4773-10, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1550193. 
 7. Brendan Maher, Bird-Flu Research: The Biosecurity Oversight, 485 NATURE 431, 434 
(2012). 
 8. NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, NSB 12-01, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2012, 
4-13 (2012), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/pdf/c04.pdf. 
 9. See Steve Keane, The Case Against Blanket First Amendment Protection of Scientific 
Research: Articulating a More Limited Scope of Protection, 59 STAN. L. REV. 505, 514-15 
(2006). 
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The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is the principle that states the 
government cannot require a person to forego a constitutional right in order 
to receive a government-conferred benefit.10 Often, the right at issue in 
unconstitutional conditions cases is the right of free speech or freedom of 
the press under the First Amendment. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has 
decided numerous cases involving assertions of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions by those seeking a government benefit, its 
jurisprudence in this area has been inconsistent. It has not spoken on the 
doctrine’s application to scientific research, and its pronouncements provide 
conflicting clues as to how it would apply the doctrine to government 
attempts to control DURC through conditions on funding of research or 
publication of research results. 
This article explores the application of the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions as it applies to DURC, particularly in the area of life sciences 
research. Part II briefly reviews the jurisprudence of the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, and then focuses on how the courts have 
applied the doctrine in cases where the government imposes restrictions on 
recipients of federal funds that implicate their First Amendment rights of free 
expression. This would be the most common posture in which a case 
involving DURC would arise. Part III reviews the federal government’s 
current policy regarding funding and communication of life sciences DURC, 
ongoing efforts to refine and implement the policy, and whether the current 
policy is likely to be found to violate the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions. Part IV suggests that rather than ban or classify life sciences 
DURC, the government can carefully craft restrictions to define the limits on 
government-funded research that allow life sciences DURC to be conducted 
and communicated while minimizing the risk of violating the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions and preserving the scientific method. Such an 
approach is more likely to protect us than the use of more draconian 
methods of ensuring secrecy. This approach will not endanger our place 
amongst the global community of life sciences and international public 
health experts, but will ensure that we continue to have a place at the table 
while keeping a watchful eye on the work that is being done. 
II.  THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS 
AND GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is implicated when the 
government seeks a quid pro quo that limits the exercise of a person’s 
 
 10. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) 
(citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)). 
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constitutional rights in exchange for a government benefit.11 The doctrine 
has been asserted in connection with a wide variety of government benefits. 
Receipt of tax deductions,12 tax-exempt status,13 government employment,14 
direct funding for participation in a government program,15 government 
funding to assist in carrying out one’s core, non-governmental functions,16 
and funding to participate in a government-created limited public forum17 
have all been deemed to be government benefits that trigger scrutiny under 
the doctrine. The doctrine is implicated both by conditions on government 
benefits that compel speech18 and by conditions that require the recipient to 
refrain from speaking.19 Generally, the doctrine prevents the government 
from doing indirectly, through the withholding of a benefit, what it could not 
do directly through regulatory or statutory command.20 The doctrine applies 
even when the government has no obligation to offer the benefits in the first 
place.21 
Although the government has “wide latitude to set spending priorities,” 
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions clearly applies when the 
government acts under its Spending Clause authority as a disburser of 
federal funds or a subsidizer of private activities.22 Although the usual way 
for a party to object to a condition placed on the receipt of federal funds is 
to decline the funds, a party cannot be forced to choose between exercising 
its constitutional rights under the First Amendment and receiving a 
government benefit or subsidy.23 In particular, the government cannot use 
the provision or refusal to provide a benefit in order to suppress ideas that it 
deems “dangerous.”24 And when the government does place conditions on 
funding that implicate the recipient’s First Amendment rights, they need to 
 
 11. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1664 (9th ed. 2009). 
 12. Speiser v. Randall, Assessor of Contra Cnty., Cal., 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958). 
 13. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545. 
 14. Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
 15. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198-99 (1991); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 
531 U.S. 533, 533, 548 (2001). 
 16. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 
378 (1984); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998); 
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 211 (2003); Agency for Int’l Dev. v. 
Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12 (June 20, 2013). 
 17. See Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
 18. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12. 
 19. See Legal Servs. Corp., 531 U.S. at 544. 
 20. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 597. 
 21. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8. 
 22. Finley, 524 U.S. at 588. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8. 
 23. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 587. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 7-8. 
 24. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 
(1983). 
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be precisely targeted at the dangers that may exist to justify the abridgment 
of the right to free expression.25 
The context of the speech that is sought to be restricted is also relevant 
to determine whether a condition placed on government funding is 
unconstitutional. Restrictions that are placed on areas that have been 
traditionally public forums for expressive activity are particularly suspect, as 
are restrictions that attempt to leverage government funding to regulate 
private speech that the speaker undertakes outside of the contours of the 
government-funded program.26 
There are a number of complicating factors and uncertainties that make 
it difficult to determine whether a condition put on government funding is 
likely to pass constitutional muster. Disagreement amongst members of the 
Supreme Court about how to characterize or weigh these factors has led to 
a large number of closely split decisions regarding the application of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to government funding.27 Therefore, 
it is extremely difficult to predict whether any specific condition will pass 
muster. Many, if not all, of these complicating factors and uncertainties are 
present when the subject of the government funding is life sciences DURC. 
Thus, as will be discussed in Part III, any effort by the government to 
articulate an effective and legally sustainable approach to controlling DURC 
is likely to be difficult, complex, and may need to be undertaken on a case-
by-case basis. 
Nevertheless, we can draw some guidance from the case law regarding 
what kinds of restrictions on life sciences DURC the courts will look upon 
favorably and unfavorably. One factor that the Court has considered 
significant is whether or not the expressive activity that was sought to be 
prohibited or restricted can be segregated from other, non-government 
funded activities that a grant recipient undertakes.28 Generally, when a 
restriction is limited to a grant recipient’s work in the government-funded 
program, leaving the recipient free to speak on the restricted topic in other 
contexts, the restriction will be upheld (provided it is not otherwise 
objectionable).29 For example, in Rust v. Sullivan, a provision of a statute 
 
 25. See Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 
380 (1984). 
 26. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 11; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
197-99 (1991); Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 476-77 (D.D.C. 
1991). 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 197 (2003) (six-
justice plurality, with three dissenters); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 533 
(2001) (five-four decision); Rust, 500 U.S. at 173 (five-four decision); Fed. Commc’ns 
Comm’n, 468 U.S. at 354 (five-four decision). 
 28. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 197. 
 29. Id. at 199. 
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was upheld that prevented recipients of government funding for family 
planning services from counseling clients about abortions or referring clients 
for abortions.30 The restriction was upheld because it was couched in terms 
of a prohibition on the government-funded project, rather than a prohibition 
aimed at the recipient of the government funds.31 
In its most recent term, the Court reiterated this distinction between 
conditions on speech that are confined to the actual government spending 
program being funded, and conditions that seek to regulate speech outside 
of the boundaries of the government program itself.32 The former were cited 
with approval, while the Court struck down as unconstitutional a 
requirement that a recipient of federal funds affirmatively espouse a point of 
view that was not limited to its work within the scope of the government-
funded program.33 
Yet, even in making this distinction, the Court has not been entirely 
consistent. For example, consistent with this policy, in Federal 
Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters, the Court struck 
down a prohibition on editorializing by noncommercial educational 
broadcasting stations who received grants from the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting (CPB), noting that even a station that received only one 
percent of its overall income from the CPB would be barred from all 
editorializing.34 The Court reasoned that such a station could not segregate 
its activities according to the source of its funding.35 Further, in Legal 
Services Corporation v. Carmen Velazquez, the Court struck down a 
requirement that legal services providers funded by the Legal Services 
Corporation (LSC), which distributes federal funds to grantees who provide 
legal services to low-income and indigent clients, refrain from trying to 
amend or challenge then-existing welfare laws.36 The prohibition in 
Velazquez was interpreted to apply not only to cases or clients that were 
funded by the LSC, but also to any work by a recipient of LSC funds, 
regardless of whether or not she was acting on behalf of a LSC-funded 
 
 30. Id. at 177-78. 
 31. Id. at 196-97. 
 32. See Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 8. 
 33. Id. at 12. The requirement at issue was that a group or organization accepting the 
federal funds have “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking.” Id. at 1. 
 34. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 468 U.S. at 365. 
 35. Id. at 400. The Court contrasted this situation with the situation presented by a non-
profit §501(c)(3) organization prohibited from lobbying by tax-exemption law, but that could 
establish a separate §501(c)(4) affiliate to pursue its lobbying efforts, without forfeiting its tax-
exempt status. Id. It then stated that the educational broadcasting station could not segregate 
its activities according to the source of its funding in the same manner, although it did not say 
why that would not be possible. Id. 
 36. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 547-48 (2001). 
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client.37 In striking down this restriction, the Court did not specifically state 
that the funding condition was unconstitutional because it attempted to 
restrict speech outside of the context of the federally funded program; 
rather, it focused on its belief that there would likely be no alternative source 
for a client to receive the type of advocacy that the government sought to 
restrict.38 
This was unlike the situation approved in Rust, where, according to the 
Court, the client seeking family planning services was not required to forego 
the government-funded services in order to receive abortion counseling 
through an alternative channel.39 The Court did not explicitly state that the 
application of the restriction on speech to both the government-funded 
program and to the privately funded activities in Velazquez. Nevertheless, 
the blanket prohibition on advocating for amendment or change of welfare 
statutes by LSC funding recipients is the functional equivalent of the 
leveraging prohibition seen in other cases just viewed from the perspective 
of the services recipients, rather than from the perspective of the funding 
recipients.40 
 First Amendment restrictions on the receipt of government funds have 
been upheld in some cases where the government-funded program cannot 
be segregated from privately funded programs. In United States v. American 
Library Association, Inc., the Court upheld a requirement that libraries 
receiving funds under two programs designed to help the libraries must 
provide internet access to patrons and install software to block access to 
pornographic images.41 Although the libraries could not determine whether 
a particular patron’s internet use was being funded by the federal programs 
or by other funds, and the purposes of the two federally funded programs 
could not be segregated from the general purposes of a public library, the 
Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld the software requirement against a 
challenge that it was an unconstitutional condition.42 Rather than focusing 
on the non-segregable nature of the government-funded and non-
 
 37. Id. at 538. 
 38. Id. at 535. 
 39. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 214 (1991). See also Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 546-
47. 
 40. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 547-48. 
 41. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc. 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003). 
 42. Id. at 199, 208. The two federal programs at issue were the E-rate program, 47 
U.S.C. §254(h)(1)(B), and the Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA), 20 U.S.C. §9101 et 
seq. Id. at 201-02. The purpose of the E-rate program was “[to] help open new worlds of 
knowledge, learning, and education to all Americans . . .” Id. at 212. The purpose of the 
LSTA was “to stimulate excellence and promote access to learning and information resources 
in all types of libraries for individuals of all ages.” Id. Clearly, these purposes are 
indistinguishable from the mission of a public library, regardless of the source of funding. 
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government-funded activity and the activity funded by other sources, the 
Court’s plurality characterized the software requirement as a permissible 
condition to ensure that the “public funds be spent for the purposes for 
which they were authorized.”43 
Characterizing a restriction on protected speech or expression, as a 
means of ensuring that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they 
were authorized by the government, has also been used to justify restrictions 
surrounding applications for competitive government funding –– a context 
that is most directly applicable to a potential restriction on National Institutes 
of Health (NIH) or National Science Foundation (NSF) funding for life 
sciences DURC. The difficulty in such cases is ensuring that the restriction is 
specific enough to achieve its goals without seeming to target only ideas 
that are deemed “dangerous” by the government.44 A funding restriction 
that is clearly content-based and prevents an otherwise qualified proponent 
with a seemingly “dangerous” idea from competing for funding would be a 
clear-cut example of an unconstitutional condition on government 
funding.45 Such a restriction would likely be deemed to cross the line from a 
definition of purpose “into a penalty on disfavored views,” designed to have 
a coercive effect and chill expression that the government deems 
undesirable.46 
In the context of competitive funding, as illustrated in National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, there is difficulty in distinguishing between 
permissible funding criteria that are designed to ensure that public funds are 
used for their intended purpose, and impermissible content-based 
restrictions on expression of “dangerous” ideas.47 In Finley, Congress 
responded to a public outcry about government funding for art, which many 
believed to be provocative and unworthy of government support, by 
amending the statutes that established criteria by which the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) chose projects to fund.48 The amended statute 
required the NEA to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency 
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”49 
 
 43. Id. at 211-12.  
 44. See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998). 
 45. Id. at 587 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 
540, 550 (1983)). 
 46. Id. at 587. 
 47. Id. at 583-86. 
 48. Id. at 574-75. 
 49. National Endowment for the Arts, 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2011). The provocative 
works of art that prompted the amendment of the statute were a retrospective of photographer 
Robert Mapplethorpe’s work, which included homoerotic photographs, and a photograph by 
Andres Serrano entitled “Piss Christ,” which consisted of a crucifix immersed in urine. Finley, 
524 U.S. at 574.  
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Four performance artists who had been recommended by a panel to be 
approved for NEA grants prior to the amendment of the statute, but were 
subsequently denied funding, challenged the amended statute.50 They 
claimed that the provision requiring the NEA to consider “general standards 
of decency” violated their First Amendment rights by injecting viewpoint-
based restrictions into government funding that was protected speech.51 
Although the Court did not explicitly discuss the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions, it drew heavily on prior cases that applied the 
doctrine to strike down government restrictions on expressive conduct.52 It 
ultimately distinguished those cases from the case at bar and upheld the 
statute.53 The Court noted that in the context of funding for the arts, unlike in 
many other contexts, the government does not encourage a diversity of 
views and is mandated to make aesthetic judgments.54 Because the 
challenge to the statute was facial, not as-applied, the case was 
distinguishable from a hypothetical case where the NEA used its power to 
invoke a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, which the Court said would be 
prohibited even in a government subsidy situation.55 The Court drew a clear 
distinction between situations where the government is acting as a patron by 
awarding competitive funding, and those where the government is directly 
regulating speech, stating that “Congress has wide latitude to set spending 
priorities” in the context of awarding competitive funding, whereas it has 
more limited power to directly regulate or criminalize speech.56 The Court 
 
 50. Finley, 524 U.S. at 577. 
 51. Id. at 577-78. They also claimed that the NEA had “failed to follow proper statutory 
procedures . . . had breached the confidentiality of their grant applications,” and that the 
provision in question was void for vagueness. Id. at 577. An additional amendment to the 
statute, requiring all grantees to certify in writing that they would not use federal funding to 
create projects that could be considered obscene and did not have “serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value,” was invalidated previously as unconstitutionally vague by a 
federal district court. Dep’t. of the Interior & Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 103 Stat. 
738-42 (1990). See also Finley, 524 U.S. at 575. 
 52. Finley, 524 U.S. at 621 (citing Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989)). 
 53. Id. at 586. 
 54. Id. Thus, the case was distinguishable from cases where the government creates a 
limited public forum, and then denies access to the forum by certain disfavored groups. See 
Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995). 
 55. Finley, 524 U.S. at 586-87. 
 56. Id. at 587-88. A concurrence by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, suggested 
even further deference to Congress is warranted in the context of competitive funding. Id. at 
590. The concurrence states that content and viewpoint-based criteria are constitutional 
grounds upon which to evaluate grant applications. Id. Justices Scalia and Thomas noted that 
they regard the distinction between abridging speech and funding it as a “fundamental 
divide,” and that the First Amendment is inapplicable to funding decisions. Id. at 599. 
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reasoned that without such latitude, the government would be unable to 
sponsor any competitive funding programs.57 
The Court in Finley also acknowledged the importance of the context in 
which the speech is regulated when determining whether a condition 
imposed on the receipt of government funds is constitutional.58 In areas that 
have traditionally been open to free expression “or have been expressly 
dedicated” to free speech, the government’s ability to control speech within 
that forum is subject to greater scrutiny, even when the restriction is limited 
to speech within a government-funded project.59 According to the Court, 
[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to 
the functioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech 
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of 
Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines 
of the First Amendment.60 
Because the majority of life sciences DURC is done in the university setting 
(including the avian influenza DURC that sparked the most recent 
controversy over publishing restrictions), judicial pronouncements regarding 
attempts to use research funding to restrict expressive conduct in the 
university setting are particularly applicable to determining what restrictions 
on DURC will pass constitutional muster. 
There is little case law addressing restrictions on research funding in the 
university setting.61 Nevertheless, in one case squarely on point, the NIH 
included a confidentiality clause in a grant for research into the 
development of an artificial heart.62 The confidentiality clause required 
researchers “to obtain government approval before publishing or otherwise 
 
 57. See id. at 587-88. 
 58. See id. at 590-91. 
 59. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 
U.S. 720, 726 (1990)). 
 60. Rust, 500 U.S. at 200. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 836 (discussing the 
importance of the university setting as “the center of our intellectual and philosophic 
tradition.”). 
 61. There is, however, a fair amount of legal commentary on the subject of whether 
scientific research is entitled to any kind of First Amendment protection, and if so, the 
appropriate scope of such protection. See, e.g., Steve Keane, supra note 9, at 505; Barry P. 
McDonald, Government Regulation or Other “Abridgements” of Scientific Research: The 
Proper Scope of Judicial Review Under the First Amendment, 54 EMORY L. J. 979 (2005). 
However, all agree that expression carried out in the course of performing scientific research, 
and communication of the results of scientific research are entitled to First Amendment 
protection. For purposes of this article, I presume that protected communication about 
scientific research is not segregable from the research itself. Therefore, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions is triggered at all stages of the research. 
 62. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 473 
(D.D.C. 1991). 
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publicly discussing preliminary research results.”63 Stanford University 
submitted a proposal to do the research but objected to the confidentiality 
clause.64 When the government and Stanford could not agree on the clause, 
the contract was awarded to a different university. Stanford sued the 
government claiming the clause was “an illegal prior restraint on speech 
and an unconstitutional condition on a government benefit.”65 
First, the Stanford court noted that the restriction failed the segregability 
test of Rust v. Sullivan.66 Under the confidentiality clause, the Stanford 
researchers could not speak about the artificial heart research outside of the 
context of the government-funded research program.67 In addition, the 
Stanford court noted that the subject of the lawsuit, a restriction on speech 
at a university, was “the very free expression that the Rust Court held to be 
so important to the functioning of American society . . . .”68 Taking a strong 
position in favor of academic freedom, the Stanford court said: 
Stanford University, a premier academic institution, engaged in significant 
scientific and medical research for the benefit of the American people, is not 
ipso facto compelled under the law to surrender its free speech rights and 
those of its scientific researchers to a ‘contracting officer’ merely because a 
regulation issued by defendants so directs. There exists, after all, the First 
Amendment to the Constitution, the supreme law of the land, which protects 
those very rights.69 
The Stanford court concluded that the confidentiality clause, when 
applied to the university setting, was an unenforceable, unconstitutional 
condition.70 The court ordered that the contract, without the confidentiality 
clause, be awarded to Stanford University.71 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 473-74. 
 66. Id. at 476. 
 67. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 773 F.Supp. at 476. 
 68. Id. at 477. 
 69. Id. at 478. 
 70. Id. at 479. The Stanford court was also less than convinced that any harm would flow 
from publication of the preliminary research results concerning the artificial heart. The 
government’s purported reason for the confidentiality clause was to protect the public health 
and safety by protecting prospective patients from “unwarranted hope.” Id. at 477 n.16. The 
Stanford court called this “a strange and attenuated way of protecting health and safety.” Id. A 
court considering a similar confidentiality clause concerning DURC might be less skeptical 
about the government’s claims of public harm that would result from premature or 
unauthorized publication of the results, and more inclined to defer to the government’s request 
to block disclosure. See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 996 (W.D. 
Wis. 1979) (in a case where the United States sought an injunction against a magazine 
seeking to publish details about how to build an atomic bomb, the judge, while 
acknowledging the government’s heavy burden of proof to suppress publication, noted that 
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When deciding whether such a restriction or prohibition of speech is 
constitutional, the courts have also considered the practical effect that tying 
government funding to restricting free expression is likely to have on the 
overall exercise of First Amendment rights in American society.72 The 
Stanford court recognized that very few sizable undertakings in the modern 
world are not supported in some manner by government funds.73 It 
reasoned that if the government’s position regarding the confidentiality 
clause was accepted as law, it would present an “enormous threat” to First 
Amendment rights, and indeed, to a “free society.”74 
Often, the governmental funding agency occupies a dominant role in 
the financing of the contemplated endeavor.75 In such cases, receiving the 
government funding is like an “imprimatur” that acts as a proxy for merit 
and value.76 When the selection criteria for government funding from a 
government agency that is dominant in the field are viewpoint-based, they 
have a chilling effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights outside of 
the context of the government-funded project.77 Furthermore, when it is 
customary for private donors to match government funds awarded under 
competitive grants, the chilling effect of the funding restriction is 
magnified.78 In the context of funding for scientific research, including 
 
“[a] mistake in ruling against the United States could pave the way for thermonuclear 
annihilation for us all. In that event, our right to life is extinguished and the right to publish 
becomes moot.” The judge issued the injunction.). See also, L. A. Powe, Jr., The H-Bomb 
Injunction, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 55 (1990). 
 71. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 773 F. Supp. at 479. 
 72. Id. at 478. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts et al. v. Finley et al., 524 U.S. 569, 621-22 
(1998) (Souter, J., dissenting); Rosenberger et al. v. Rector of the Univ. of Va. et al., 515 U.S. 
819, 835 (1995). The recent case of Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012), adds an interesting wrinkle to the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions when the 
recipient of federal funds is a state institution. In NFIB, the Supreme Court held, for the first 
time, that the conditions placed on an offer of federal money under a Spending Clause 
program (Medicaid) amounted to inappropriate “coercion” of the states, and could not be 
enforced. Id. at 2603-04. Central to the Court’s reasoning on this point was the extremely 
large portions of state budgets that are comprised of federal Medicaid funds. Id. at 2604-05. 
If funds for DURC are offered to a state institution, such as a state university, with onerous 
restrictions on the right of free expression, and the funds are vital to the continuation of the 
university’s research mission, under NFIB, it is possible that a court could consider the 
conditional funding an offer the state cannot refuse, and could strike the conditions down as 
overly coercive. 
 76. Finley, 524 U.S. at 622 (Souter, J., dissenting), (quoting Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. 
v. Frohnmayer, 754 F. Supp. 774, 783 (C.D. Cal. 1991)). 
 77. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 622 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 78. Id. 
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DURC, competitive grant-based funding from the NIH, NSF, or other 
government agencies may occupy the role of primary funding source.79 
Thus, any restriction placed on the conduct or publication of DURC has the 
potential to chill scientific research beyond the context of government-
funded research, as well as within government-funded projects.80 Preventing 
this effect requires that restrictions be carefully considered, as they may 
adversely affect the ability of an applicant to advance her research agenda 
outside of, as well as within the scope of, the government-funded project. 
In the context of life sciences DURC, all of the factors that the Court has 
considered significant when distinguishing between unconstitutional 
conditions and permissible restrictions on funding of government projects 
are present. The research usually takes place in a traditionally open forum, 
such as a university.81 The government funding agencies are dominant in 
the market for funding, and the government’s pronouncements on the 
fundability of the research are often taken as statements about the merit of 
the proposal.82 Government and private funds are often mixed together to 
fund a single project, and the availability of private funds may also depend 
on whether the project is publicly funded.83 Because of the large number of 
factors that affect the constitutionality of restrictions placed on government 
funding, and the even larger number of combinations of these factors that 
might attach to any particular offer of funding, it is extremely important that 
any restrictions placed on the conduct or publication of government-funded 
DURC be narrowly tailored to protect the public or the country’s national 
security in a manner that places the least amount of restrictions on 
constitutionally protected expression.84 
 
 79. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 14. 
 80. The federal government appears to recognize this chilling potential. In the proposed 
United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research 
of Concern, the government notes that “designating research as DURC should not be seen as 
a negative categorization . . . As a general matter, designation of research as DURC does not 
mean that the research should not be conducted or communicated.” Id. at 3. 
 81. See Keane, supra note 9, at 532. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. The question of whether scientific research of any kind is protected by the First 
Amendment is unresolved. See, e.g., id. at 523 (arguing that scientific research is protected by 
the First Amendment in only limited circumstances, when it constitutes “expressive” conduct); 
McDonald, supra note 61, at 986 (arguing that there is no First Amendment right of scientific 
research per se, but restraints on such research could trigger incidental restrictions on 
expression that is protected under the First Amendment); Cass. R. Sunstein, Is There a 
Constitutional Right to Clone?, 53 HAST. L. J. 987, 1003 (2002) (stating that the jurisprudence 
in the area is “ill-developed”). A discussion of whether scientific research is protected by the 
First Amendment is beyond the scope of this article. It is generally agreed that communication 
of research results or discussion of research (non-classified) is expression protected by the First 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
94 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:81 
III.  CURRENT GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO RESTRICT OR CONTROL EXPRESSIVE 
CONDUCT IN LIFE SCIENCES DURC 
Concerns about the wisdom and public safety surrounding life sciences 
DURC is not new.85 Nevertheless, the anthrax attacks of 2001, which 
followed closely on the heels of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 
(9/11), heightened awareness about life sciences DURC and its potential to 
endanger public health and safety and added some urgency to the debate 
about controlling the flow of such information.86 After the anthrax attacks, 
some scientific professional societies and the editors of major journals in the 
life sciences considered instituting policies restricting publication of 
information on DURC that could pose national security risks, but ultimately 
rejected such an approach in favor of self-regulation.87 This was not 
surprising. Unlike other areas of scientific research which have a history and 
culture of secrecy and cooperation with the national security community, life 
sciences researchers have no such established culture.88 
A. The Fink Report and the National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense 
The federal government recognized the tensions between minimizing or 
eliminating the potential threats to national security and public health threats 
by life sciences DURC with the legitimate needs of life sciences researchers 
to communicate research in sufficient detail to permit peer review for validity 
and reproducibility in order to advance biomedical and life sciences 
research.89 Therefore, in 2003, “the [National Academy of Science] (NAS) 
appointed a committee to propose a framework that could be used to 
minimize national security and public health threats posed by [life sciences] 
DURC without undermining biomedical research and science.”90 The 
committee produced a comprehensive report in 2004, popularly known as 
 
Amendment. See Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973); Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 773 F. Supp. 472, 477; Keane, supra note 9, at 520-23. This article focuses on 
attempts to restrict the expressive conduct involved in both the production and publication of 
life sciences DURC. 
 85. See Vickie J. Williams, The “Jurassic Park” Problem—Dual-Use Research of Concern, 
Privately Funded Research and Protecting Public Health, 53 JURIMETRICS 361, 363-66 (2013) 
(summarizing historical efforts to control communication and publication of DURC). 
 86. Id. at 366. 
 87. COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION 
OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF 
TERRORISM 97 (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT], available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10 
827.html. 
 88. Id. at 85. 
 89. Williams, supra note 85, at 366. 
 90. Id. at 367; Ruth R. Faden & Ruth A. Karron, The Obligation to Prevent the Next Dual-
Use Controversy, 335 SCI. 802, 802-03 (2012). 
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the Fink Report (named after committee chair, Professor Gerald R. Fink, of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology), which suggested a multiple-
pronged approach to national safety and life sciences DURC.91 Although 
the Fink Report made recommendations regarding the education of 
scientists concerning the risks of DURC, training methods for personnel 
involved in DURC, and physical containment of potentially dangerous 
pathogens, it did not recommend expansion of the use of the classified or 
top secret designations for such research.92 The committee was very 
concerned about the risk of a “chilling effect” that such designations would 
have on life sciences research, and the danger that such an effect would 
pose to continued progress in the areas of life sciences research and public 
health.93 The committee endorsed a “softer” approach, recommending 
creation of the NSABB, a body of experts that would act as a liaison 
between the government and the life sciences community to facilitate 
oversight and review of DURC.94 
The federal government followed the committee’s recommendations and 
established the NSABB.95 The NSABB consists of a broad spectrum of 
experts including, “scientists, lawyers, infectious disease experts, scientific 
editors, and public health experts.”96 The avian influenza experiments, 
discussed in Part I, were the first time that the NSABB recommended that 
scientific manuscripts be redacted to exclude experiment methodology and 
details to prevent replication of the experiments prior to publication.97 
Although the authors and the journal editors agreed to consider the 
recommendation, it was on the condition that the government would allow 
restricted circulation of the complete manuscripts to those with a legitimate 
need for the information.98 While the issue was being discussed, the World 
Health Organization weighed in with its opinion, concluding that publication 
 
 91. FINK REPORT, supra note 87, at 111-26. 
 92. Id. at 118. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 110-11. 
 95. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. ON BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR DUAL 
USE RESEARCH, 1, 30 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/documents/ 
COMBINED_Codes_PDFs.pdf. 
 96. See The Risk of Dual-Use Research, supra note 5, at 12 (testimony of Dr. Paul S. 
Keim, Acting Chairman, National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity). 
 97. Id. at 6 (testimony of Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Director, National Institute of Allergy 
and Infectious Diseases). 
 98. Statement by Dr. Bruce Alberts, Editor-in-Chief, Sci., Regarding Publication of H5N1 
Avian Influenza Research (Dec, 20, 2011), http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2011/media/ 
1220herfst_statement.pdf). 
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of the full manuscripts was preferable from a public health perspective.99 
One of the scientist-authors, Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., advocated 
publicly for wide dissemination of the research so that researchers from 
other areas could contribute to the vital field of influenza research.100 
Ultimately, after reviewing additional data and the revised manuscripts, the 
NSABB withdrew its recommendation for redaction and the manuscripts 
were published in full.101 
B. The United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual 
Use Research of Concern 
Current U.S. policy regarding the funding and control of DURC 
contemplates close cooperation and partnerships between the NSABB, 
private researchers, and the funding agencies, as suggested by the Fink 
Report. This approach is reflected in the official guidance documents and 
pronouncements that the government has produced since the controversial 
avian influenza experiments. 
While the avian influenza controversy continued to percolate without a 
resolution, the U.S. issued its Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern (Dual Use Policy).102 The Dual Use Policy is designed 
to address existing, unclassified, ongoing research that has already been 
funded, as well as research that has been previously proposed but is 
pending a funding decision.103 It is specifically limited to work with one of 
15 identified biological agents and toxins (including avian influenza 
 
 99. The Risk of Dual-Use Research, supra note 5, at 8-9 (2012) (statement of Anthony 
Fauci, Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases), available at 
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/2012-04-26-fauci-testimony-biological-security. 
 100. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Flu Transmission Work is Urgent, 482 NATURE 155, 155 (2012). 
 101. The influenza research community also initiated a voluntary moratorium on avian 
influenza research, that lasted for approximately one year. The Risk of Dual-Use Research, 
supra note 5, at 7; Denise Grady, Research to Resume on Modified, Deadlier Bird Flu, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at A8. The United States released new guidelines for such research on 
Feb. 22, 2013, thus allowing such research to resume in the United States, or elsewhere with 
American funding. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FUNDING DECISIONS ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS 
WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT 
ARE TRANSMISSIBLE AMONG MAMMALS BY RESPIRATORY DROPLETS, available at https://www.phe. 
gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/funding-hpai-h5n1.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
FRAMEWORK]. 
 102. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR OVERSIGHT 
OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN, 1 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih. 
gov/oba/biosecurity/PDF/United_States_Government_Policy_for_Oversight_of_DURC_FINAL 
_version_032812.pdf. 
 103. Id. at 3. 
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virus).104 It is also limited to seven categories of experiments that utilize these 
agents, which are considered to be most likely to produce DURC.105 Its main 
proposed method for controlling expressive conduct in the context of life 
sciences DURC is through the development of a risk mitigation plan with 
cooperation between the federal funding agency and the institution or 
researcher.106 This plan can include “[d]etermining the venue and mode of 
communication (addressing content, timing, and possibly the extent of 
distribution of the information) to communicate the research responsibly.”107 
If such measures prove inadequate to mitigate the risks posed by the 
research, the federal funding agency may request voluntary redaction of 
communications or publication, may classify the research, or may terminate 
or refuse to provide research funding.108 
Experts in life sciences research and public health who are reviewing the 
Dual Use Policy have pointed out many of the problems with this approach 
because it can lead to uncertainty about the constitutionality of any actions 
taken under the Policy that restrict communications regarding the research 
or its results.109 They point out that the lack of uniform standards or 
guidelines among funding agencies with regard to what constitutes risk 
could pose “significant security and compliance challenges for institutions 
receiving funding from more than one government agency,” perhaps 
foreshadowing a challenge to a restriction based on the inability to 
segregate the restricted research from non-restricted research, or based on 
competing restrictions.110 They have also pointed out that the Dual Use 
Policy does not provide research institutions or agencies with sufficient 
guidance on how to minimize the risk that misuse could occur once results, 
methods, or information generated by the research are communicated.111 
 
 104. Id at 2. 
 105. Id. at 2-3. 
 106. Id. at 3. 
 107. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 102, at 3. 
 108. Id. at 3-4. 
 109. See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Report of a Meeting on 
“Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: A Discussion about Dual Use Review 
and Oversight at Research Institutions” held at AAAS headquarters in Washington D.C. 13-14 
Sept. 2012, http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/programs/bridging-science.shtml [hereinafter Bridging 
Science]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 22. See also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, A Troubling Equation in Contracts for 
Government Funded Scientific Research: “Sensitive But Unclassified” = Secret But 
Unconstitutional, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 113, 141 (2005) (arguing that the 
government’s expanded use of the designation “sensitive but unclassified” for scientific 
information and research since 9/11 is unconstitutional because of imprecise definitions, 
requirements of enforcement by prepublication review, and lack of a sufficient link between 
the information and a clear national security danger). 
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This may be an indication that it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, 
to narrowly tailor any restriction to mitigate the specific harm contemplated, 
a constitutional requirement for restrictions of speech, absent a complete 
moratorium on publication or communication, for example, classifying the 
research.112 
To the extent that the Dual Use Policy applies to research that has 
already been undertaken, attempts to block publication or otherwise control 
communications after the funding has already been awarded would be akin 
to a government agency that agreed to fund a project in the arts and then, 
upon reviewing the resulting work of art either while in progress or upon 
completion, imposed a new criterion tailored to that project so that it could 
not be shown to its intended audience. Whereas in National Endowment for 
the Arts, the Court upheld subjective criteria on funding of arts projects that 
could be considered viewpoint-based or content-specific as part of a 
competitive funding process.113 It would have been quite a different case if 
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) had funded the projects, viewed 
the completed work, and then deemed it unacceptable for public viewing.114 
The experts also noted that overly restrictive policies are likely to have a 
chilling effect on research that falls under the Dual Use Policy, with 
concomitant negative effects on biodefense preparedness, health and 
agriculture, and increased vulnerability to biological threats.115 They also 
recognized the incompatibility of redacting scientific publications to remove 
information that supports the quality and reproducibility of the research in 
question with the very nature of the scientific endeavor and academic 
freedom.116 The experts discussed the reality that scientific research is 
communicated to various audiences through various venues throughout the 
lifetime of a research project, and how that reality is incompatible with 
attempts to censor, redact, or embargo results and methods, particularly in 
an era of instantaneous communication through the Internet and social 
media.117 The report discussed that DURC can emerge from work that is not 
 
 112. See Jacobs, supra note 111, at 142-44. 
 113. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587. 
 114. Id. at 571. 
 115. Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 22. 
 116. Id. at 23. 
 117. Id. The experts have also discussed the problems surrounding life sciences DURC in 
the international arena, which poses additional challenges to controlling DURC from misuse. 
See American Association for the Advancement of Science, Proceedings from the Meeting on 
“Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research: International Science and Security” 
held at AAAS headquarters in Washington D.C. 4-5 Feb. 2013, http://www.aaas.org/cstsp/ 
files/International-Science-and-Security-AAAS-AAU-APLU-FBI_2013.pdf. A discussion of the 
international implications of trying to control DURC is beyond the scope of this article, but the 
control of the spread of information about DURC internationally may trigger regulations 
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related to work with the select agents that are subject to the Dual Use 
Policy.118 Finally, the report noted that expansion of the government’s review 
of scientific research for DURC that is outside of the scope of the Dual Use 
Policy’s 15 select agents might be prudent.119 
C. A Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Funding Decisions with Regard to Avian Influenza H5N1 
Research Proposals 
The first indication of how the U.S. will make future funding decisions for 
projects that implicate life sciences DURC since the avian influenza 
experiments appeared in guidelines recently issued by the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS).120 The guidelines were published as A 
Framework for Guiding U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
Funding Decisions about Research Proposals with the Potential for 
Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are 
Transmissible among Mammals by Respiratory Droplets121 (Framework), and 
is designed to “ensure a robust review of research proposals prior to making 
a funding decision,” taking into consideration all risks and benefits of the 
proposal.122 Among the criteria the funding agency will use to determine 
funding are whether the research information is intended to be broadly 
shared in order to “realize its potential benefits to global health,” and 
whether the research “will be supported through funding mechanisms that 
facilitate appropriate oversight of the conduct and communication of the 




regarding export controls. Indeed, the avian influenza researchers had to receive permission 
under export control regulations to publish their papers. See Bridging Science, supra note 
109, at 10. 
 118. Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 24. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See FRAMEWORK, supra note 101, at 2. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 5. 
 124. Id. at 4. 
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With regard to controlling communication of DURC, the Framework 
does very little to address the concerns regarding vagueness that were 
raised by the experts reviewing the Dual Use Policy. Instead, the funding 
criteria contains a vague statement that the funding mechanism must 
facilitate “appropriate oversight” of the communication of research, and 
explicitly states that HHS must consider each proposal on a case-by-case 
basis.125 
The Framework also contemplates a departmental-level review to 
“consider proposals in the context of the entire HHS research portfolio” of 
avian influenza research.126 At this level, HHS can determine whether the 
risks associated with the project are unjustified in light of other, similar 
 
 125. FRAMEWORK, supra note 101, at 3, 5. 
 126. Id. at 7. 
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research that HHS or other federal agencies currently support with 
funding.127 If the department-level review determines that the proposal is 
unacceptable for HHS funding, the proposal is deemed ineligible for 
funding agency support.128 The Framework does not contain any appeal 
mechanism for applicants denied funding outside of HHS.129 
D. U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual 
Use Research of Concern 
In order to enlist the cooperation and expertise of the institutions that 
actually conduct life sciences DURC, and perhaps to respond to some of the 
criticisms regarding the vagueness of the restrictions on communication and 
publication of DURC contained in the Dual Use Policy, the U.S. published 
the proposed Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern (Institutional Oversight Policy) in February 2013.130 
Unfortunately, the Institutional Oversight Policy raises more constitutional 
questions than it answers. 
The Institutional Oversight Policy takes a holistic approach to life 
sciences DURC. Rather than view methodologies, products, technologies, or 
publication as separate steps in the process that are subject to separate 
criteria and controls, the Institutional Oversight Policy considers the entire 
course of research as a whole product.131 This closely reflects the reality of 
how scientific research is conducted and communicated. The Institutional 
Oversight Policy includes an acknowledgement of the importance of “free 
and open conduct and communication of life sciences research” to the 
scientific enterprise and encourages continuation of such conduct and 
communication as a goal of both the government and the institutions 
engaged in the research.132 The Institutional Oversight Policy sets forth an 
organizational framework for the institutional oversight process that places 
joint responsibility for reviewing projects that could implicate life sciences 
DURC on the principal investigator, the institution receiving federal funding, 
and the funding agency.133 This process is set forth below:134 
  
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. (explaining that if applicants are denied, they may “resubmit their proposal 
during a future grant cycle). 
 130. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-70 (Feb. 22, 2013). 
 131. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 3. 
 132. Id. at 5. 
 133. Id. at 8-9. 
 134. Id. at 9. 
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In addition, the Institutional Oversight Policy makes it clear that it is the 
responsibility of the principal investigators is “to communicate DURC in a 
responsible manner” while affirming that such communication “is an 
essential activity that occurs throughout the research process,” not just at the 
point of publication.135 
Perhaps the most interesting part of the Institutional Oversight Policy, 
from the standpoint of the constitutional implications of restrictions that 
might be included in a funding decision, or a risk mitigation plan that is 
required by the government in order to receive funding, is the application of 
the policy to “[i]nstitutions within the United States that receive federal funds 
to conduct or sponsor life sciences research, and conduct or sponsor 
research that is within the scope identified in Section 6.2, regardless of 
source of funding.”136 The government’s justification for this broad 
application of the policy is that it “promotes more meaningful oversight of 
DURC at the institutional level and fosters uniform approaches to the 
 
 135. Id. at 9-10. 
 136. Id. at 6. The policy also applies to foreign institutions “that receive federal funds to 
conduct or sponsor research” that is covered under the scope of the policy. Id. 
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responsible conduct and communication of all research that may raise 
DURC concerns at an institution.”137 
Through this broad application of this policy, the government is placing 
a condition on the recipient of federal funds, not just on the project that is 
being federally funded. The U.S. Supreme Court has recently said that this 
type of leveraging of a restriction on a government spending program to 
apply to privately funded speech is impermissible, even when the restriction 
is relevant to the objectives of the federal program.138 Even though this 
scope of restriction may be practical, in light of the fact that it is common for 
research money from both public and private sources to be pooled together 
to fund a single project, it squarely implicates the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine as it has been applied in such pooling situations in the past.139 
The obligation to engage in monitoring and risk mitigation continues 
beyond the initial funding stage. Failure to comply with the Institutional 
Oversight Policy may result in termination of federal funding or loss of future 
federal funding opportunities.140 Therefore, it is “an ongoing condition on 
researchers’ speech and activities,” rather than solely a funding selection 
criterion.141 The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on federal funding 
that go beyond selection criteria must be scrutinized closely to determine 
their true purpose.142 Even in light of the case for ongoing review and 
monitoring of DURC, the government has a compelling purpose to require 
projects to be related to the scope of federally funded projects, but it is less 
 
 137. United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use 
Research of Concern, supra note 114, at 12372. 
 138. See Agency for Int’l Dev. v. Alliance for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., No. 12-10, slip op. at 
8 (June 20, 2013) (“the relevant distinction that has emerged from our cases is between 
conditions that define the limits of the government spending program — those that specify the 
activities Congress wants to subsidize — and conditions that seek to leverage funding to 
regulate speech outside the contours of the program itself.”). See also Bd. of Trs. of Stanford 
Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 476 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that the Court in Rust 
made a distinction between an individual’s denial for benefits due to his own speech and the 
use of the public funds for the purposes intended.). 
 139. See, e.g., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 
364, 399-401 (1984) (explaining that because restricted government funds could not be 
segregated from private funds being used for the same project, the restriction constituted 
impermissible leveraging of the federal funding to regulate private speech outside of the scope 
of the federally funded program). United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight 
of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 12369-72 (Feb. 22, 2013). 
 140. OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 6. 
 141. Agency for Int’l Dev., No. 12-10, slip op. at 12. 
 142. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 196 (1991) (The challenged regulations 
were simply “designed to ensure that the limits of the federal program are observed,” and 
“that public funds [are] spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.”). 
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clear whether it can use its authority as leverage to monitor what is being 
done in privately funded programs.143 
E. Additional Legal Complications in Protecting Government-Funded 
Materials 
It is difficult to walk the fine line between protecting DURC from misuse 
by crafting precise, viewpoint-neutral funding conditions that are limited to 
the scope of the actual federal program being funded, and those overbroad 
prior restraints on speech and expression that are likely to suppress ideas 
that the government considers “dangerous” and have an unacceptable 
chilling effect on protected speech, even without any additional 
complicating factors. This would be true even in the absence of any 
additional complicating factors. The availability to the public of tools like the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and state open records laws, which can 
be used to access risk assessments of DURC that could provide enough 
information to facilitate misuse of DURC, makes it even more difficult to 
control DURC in order to prevent misuse.144 The culture of openness of 
public records is not only limited to FOIA and state open records laws. On 
the same day that the federal government issued the Institutional Oversight 
Policy for comment, it also issued a policy “direct[ing] each Federal 
agenc[ies] with over $100 million in annual . . . research and development 
expenditures to develop a plan to support increased public access to the 
results of research funded by the Federal Government.”145 Although 
national security should be considered when developing such a plan, the 
policy of the Obama administration is clearly turned towards greater 
transparency of federally funded materials as compared to some prior 
administrations; thus, complicating the efforts the administration is making 
to protect DURC from misuse.146 
IV.  PROTECTING GOVERNMENT FUNDED DURC FROM MISUSE WHILE PRESERVING 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
Inevitably, there are trade-offs between open dialogue and national 
security when we consider whether and how to restrict communication of 
DURC. This is true whether we are talking about communication between 
researchers within the contours of a particular project, communication of 
 
 143. Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ., 773 F. Supp. at 475. 
 144. See Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 24. 
 145. Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies 2 
(Feb. 22, 2013). 
 146. See id. at 2-3; Jacobs, supra note 111, at 120 (discussing differences between the 
Clinton and Bush administrations in how they treat responses to FOIA requests for information 
that might be considered sensitive with regard to homeland security). 
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research results in an academic setting, or formal publication of research in 
peer-reviewed journals. In today’s world of nearly instantaneous 
communication via the Internet, WikiLeaks, and Twitter, any action to restrict 
communication of DURC, even formal classification of research, is bound to 
be imperfect.147 Furthermore, classification of life sciences DURC will have 
an inevitable chilling effect on researchers’ willingness to engage in such 
research.148 Because life sciences DURC is by its very nature an international 
endeavor, all that a high degree of secrecy is likely to accomplish is a 
relocation of this important work to locations outside of the U.S. and a turn 
towards private funding sources where the government will have virtually no 
control over the research nor any ability to use its results to react to a public 
health or national security threat presented by DURC.149 In addition, with 
regard to naturally occurring pathogens such as the avian influenza virus, 
the U.S. is heavily dependent on cooperation from other countries to supply 
American researchers with samples of the pathogens. If the research results 
could not be shared between these governments and the foreign researchers 
that are supplying the pathogens for the research, it is most likely that 
foreign entities will stop supplying the U.S. with such pathogens. Secrecy is 
also anathema to the scientific endeavor and the nature of life sciences 
research, which has always relied on the free inflow and outflow of 
information and results to build upon prior work and to serve the greater 
good.150 
Life sciences DURC presents a perfect storm for the application of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the context of government funding. 
Virtually every factor that the courts have said must be considered when 
applying the doctrine and do complicate the analysis in the typical life 
sciences DURC case. These factors include the following: it typically takes 
place in a traditional forum for the free and open exchange of ideas, 
restrictions placed on communications tend to be vague and imprecise 
 
 147. Even classified information can be leaked or transmitted to those who might seek to 
misuse it to our detriment. Consider the current case of Edward Snowden, the National 
Security Agency contractor accused of leaking top-secret, classified information about a 
government surveillance program to Wikileaks. See, e.g., Jim Heintz, Edward Snowden Has 
Entered Russia, Lawyer Says, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 4, 2013, http://www.huffington 
post.com/2013/08/01/edward-snowden-russia_n_3688225.html. 
 148. See Bridging Science, supra note 109, at 22 (stating that there has already been a 
chilling effect on scientists researching with select agents because of “overly restrictive 
policies”). 
 149. With regard to privately funded DURC within the United States, it is likely that any 
such research is being conducted for ultimate commercial gain. Williams, supra note 85, at 
374. Therefore, it may be possible to control the conduct and communication of such 
research through the use of the patent law. Id. 
 150. See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1021. 
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because of the uncertainty of the results of the research, there is a serious 
need for international cooperation and openness in order to conduct the 
research, and government-funded research is usually not segregable from 
privately funded research.151 It is also virtually impossible to restrict only the 
program, rather than a recipient of the funding because of the nature of the 
scientific endeavor. On the other hand, the risk of harm if life sciences 
DURC is misused could not be greater, as it could threaten the very survival 
of the human species. Given the high stakes involved, what is the best 
course for us to take? 
Prior case law suggests that considering potential danger of misuse at 
the point of making a funding decision for a competitive grant is more likely 
to pass constitutional muster than attempts to restrict communication of 
information once the research is underway.152 Therefore, including an 
assessment for the potential for a proposed project to produce DURC and 
its misuse in funding criteria for a grant, and then using the results of the 
assessment in making a funding decision is the preferred methodology for 
controlling misuse. From a practical standpoint, it will be virtually impossible 
to restrict communications that take place between researchers while they 
carry out the research, although background checks and guidelines for 
communications carried out while actually working on the government-
funded projects are certainly available and desirable. 
Restrictions on DURC imposed at the funding stage are much more 
likely to be characterized as a permissible means of ensuring that 
government funds are used for their intended purpose than as a prohibited 
unconstitutional condition on a government benefit.153 The difficulty that the 
government will face is in appropriately characterizing conditions on the 
receipt of the funds in a manner that is constitutionally acceptable and 
sufficiently specific. Risk mitigation plans that require research results to be 
subject to government pre-publication review or be redacted prior to 
publication in a peer-reviewed journal would most likely be considered 
classic prior restraints. Prior restraints are the most disfavored type of 
restraint on speech, permitted “only in exceptional cases.”154 In addition, 
attempts to censor or block publication based on a pre-publication review 
by the funding agency will, by necessity, be content-based rather than 
content-neutral. Thus, they would most likely trigger a heightened level of 
scrutiny by a court to ensure that the restriction is narrowly tailored to avert 
the feared danger and that there is no better or less restrictive way to 
 
 151. See Keane, supra note 9, at 520, 532; See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1022. 
 152. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193, 198 (1991). 
 153. Id. at 198. 
 154. Bd. of Trs. of Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F.Supp. 472, 474 (D.D.C. 1991) 
(quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931). 
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achieve the same purpose.155 The government would be required to explain 
the danger in some detail and to convince a court that it had a “compelling 
interest” in preventing publication of the material.156 This need to explain the 
danger, in and of itself, could provide more information to those who would 
seek to misuse DURC than the government is comfortable revealing.157 
Therefore, the government is left with three basic approaches to 
controlling DURC without triggering the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions. The first approach is to not conduct the DURC at all or ban 
certain types of experiments or procedures that are most likely to produce 
DURC that could be misused. This is a choice that governments make when 
proposed research presents a clear moral dilemma and a less clear physical 
danger, such as proposals for certain stem cell research or certain types of 
cloning.158 This approach is likely to be constitutionally sound, but may put 
the U.S. at a disadvantage as compared to other nations that are less 
concerned about DURC or have fewer legal protections on speech and 
expression.159 In addition, most life sciences DURC consists of basic 
research, rather than applied research.160 Basic research, which is not 
directed towards producing a specific product or addressing a specific need, 
is more likely to lead to broad-reaching discoveries that can then be used in 
applied research to develop solutions to specific problems.161 A ban on 
basic research could hobble American scientific and engineering innovation, 
putting the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage for years to come. 
The second approach that the government could take is to classify all 
DURC and criminalize the unauthorized communication of DURC. This is 
 
 155. See McDonald, supra note 61, at 1025-27. 
 156. Id. at 1013-14. 
 157. Id. at 1025. Although the government could request an in camera examination of 
evidence, or request that the record be sealed, the more people who have knowledge of the 
potentially dangerous information, the more likely it is that the information will be leaked or 
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1024. 
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expanding their biological research capacity and workforce. NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, 
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the approach that the government has taken with atomic energy research 
and nuclear weapons development.162 This would require a sea change in 
the culture of life sciences research, which has traditionally been carried out 
by researchers in academic institutions with a goal of open flow of inputs 
and outputs, publication, and broad dissemination of results.163 Although 
this approach is likely to be constitutionally acceptable, we are likely to lose 
a whole generation of research and researchers while those who are 
uncomfortable with, unwilling, or unable to work in a classified environment 
leave the industry and new personnel are trained. Furthermore, while the 
government’s position is that wide dissemination of information concerning 
nuclear weapons research is not in the public interest or in the interest of 
national security,164 its position regarding dissemination of life sciences 
research that could constitute DURC is far less clear. Life sciences DURC 
can be used to better the public health on an international scale, and broad 
dissemination of the results of DURC, if not misused, may enhance national 
security if they are used to stop a pandemic or to produce a vaccine that 
can be used worldwide. Although classification of life sciences DURC would 
minimize the likelihood that DURC will be misused, it is not the preferred 
method of controlling misuse. 
Finally, the government can continue to fund DURC through competitive 
grant making and can use funding conditions to “ensure that th[ose] funds 
are properly applied to the prescribed use.”165 However, merely calling a 
condition on grant funding a definition of the program will not necessarily 
insulate the condition from a challenge to its constitutionality.166 The courts 
will look to its overall effect, beyond the label placed on the condition by the 
government.167 A condition that reaches beyond the federally funded project 
and restricts what the grantee can do or say when working on other projects 
is likely to be invalidated.168 Likewise, conditions that restrict the grantee’s 
 
 162. See id. at 1022. 
 163. See id. at 1022-23 (explaining that “a researcher desiring . . . information . . . would 
be barred from acquiring it without government authorization, even from another researcher 
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 164. See id. at 1023. 
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work or communications on projects where federal funds are mixed with 
private funds restrict recipients, not programs, and are likely to be 
susceptible to a constitutional challenge.169 Therefore, a restriction placed 
on communications of DURC that is part of a risk mitigation plan put in 
place to comply with the current draft of the Institutional Oversight Policy is 
likely to be vulnerable to constitutional challenge,170 because the current 
draft of the policy places oversight requirements on non-federally funded 
research as a condition of receiving federal funds.171 
Beyond these broad guidelines, when it comes to distinguishing 
“between conditions that define a federal program and those that reach 
outside it,”172 we will have to review specific risk mitigation plans on a case-
by-case basis to determine the constitutionality of the plan. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Life sciences DURC presents unparalleled opportunities for 
enhancements to public health and national security, as well as unparalleled 
possibilities for national and global disaster. Trying to ensure that we reap 
the benefits of such research without unleashing catastrophe also presents 
difficult challenges to preservation of our fundamental freedoms of 
expression. In a global environment, conducting all such research in secret 
or banning the conduct of life sciences DURC is not wise or practical, and 
might actually produce the bad effect that we would be trying to avoid. 
Because the government is a major financial sponsor of life sciences 
DURC, one would assume that the government can control the conduct and 
dissemination of such research. But the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions limits what restrictions the government can place on protected 
expressive conduct, especially when the government’s intent is to suppress 
ideas that can be dangerous. Although the government is permitted to place 
conditions on research that define the scope of the funded project, it is not 
permitted to leverage those restrictions to control speech or expression 
outside of the scope of the project. In the context of science and scientific 
communication, it is particularly difficult to segregate conduct that takes 
place within the scope of the federally funded project from conduct that is 
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400 (1984); Rust, 500 U.S. at 180 (noting that the federally funded program subject to the 
restriction on speech was required by regulation to be “physically and financially separate” 
from other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities). 
 170. See OFF. SCI. & TECH. POLICY, supra note 1, at 10. 
 171. See id. at 12. 
 172. “Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.” Agency for Int’l Dev., 
No. 12-10, slip op. at 11 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 
(1937)). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
110 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 7:81 
outside of the scope of the project. The very nature of the scientific 
endeavor, academic freedom, and the culture of life sciences research work 
against the ability to make such distinctions. 
Therefore, a mix of voluntary policing by the scientific community, 
coupled with carefully crafted definitions that limit the scope of federally 
funded life sciences research that is likely to produce DURC, is the more 
appropriate means of protection. This is the course that the government is 
currently on and should continue to pursue. Project scope definitions should 
avoid outright restrictions on publication or communication of research to 
avoid triggering the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Limits placed on 
each funded project should be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to ensure 
that the government is not seeking to leverage its funding to regulate 
expression outside of the contours of the funded program itself. 
History tells us that: 
Every major technology — metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, 
aviation, electronics, nuclear energy — has been intensively exploited, not 
only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen 
with biotechnology, certain to be the dominant technology of the coming 
[21st] century?173 
As government policy on life sciences DURC continues to evolve with the 
science, experts will need to continue their vigilance to protect public health, 
national security, and our fundamental freedoms, even when these interests 
seem on first glance to be mutually incompatible. This work will not be easy, 
but it is vitally important to preserving a robust scientific community, our 
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